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ABSTRACT
The paper deals with the efficiency dynamics of the Croatian
banking industry, covering the period from 2006 to 2015. We
have implemented the intermediation approach, using interest
and non-interest expenses and revenues as the input and output
variables, respectively. The variable return to scale (BCC) Data
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) output-oriented model has been
implemented, and we have estimated the crisis-driven efficiency
trends, as well as the impact of the EU membership. We further
estimated the efficiency effects of the relative market power/size,
ownership structure, and origin of capital. The global crisis had
detrimental effects since the overall efficiency score dropped by
about 3%. On the contrary, Croatian banks have largely benefited
from the EU membership, and the efficiency score after the EU
association increased by about 45%. The market leaders are more
efficient than the competitive fringe, which is in line with the effi-
ciency structure hypothesis. In addition, the biggest banks are the
most efficient ones, meaning that the scale efficiency hypothesis
has also been upheld. Contrary to the agency theory hypothesis,
state-owned banks are permanently more efficient than private
banks. Finally, the results support the home-field advantage
hypothesis exclusively for the pre-crisis period (2006–2009).
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Over the last three decades, the global financial markets have undergone dramatic
institutional transformations. They have been affected by liberalisation and financial
globalisation on one hand, and a changing macroprudential regulation and supervis-
ory role, on the other hand. In addition, the bank-based financial sectors of the for-
mer socialist countries, previously driven by central planning, lived through the
disruptive financial meltdowns which required both restructuring and transition. The
Croatian banking market was not isolated from these “tectonic” structural changes.
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After successful privatisation, the Croatian banking market became more competitive
and internationalised. Official Croatian National Bank (CNB) data state that only
about 6% of the market share was held by domestic banks in 2015. Also, the concen-
tration indicators (CR5, HHI) suggest suboptimal competition (moderate concentra-
tion) of the banking market.
The dynamic and competitive environment, driven by ever-increasing market chal-
lenges, emphasises financial intermediation efficiency as an important performance,
both for banks and the supervisory agencies. Namely, banks intend to increase their
market share and profitability through efficiency, implicitly shaping the market struc-
ture (competition). Also, efficiency is an indicator of operational performances
equally interesting for both the national and international regulatory bodies. By moni-
toring the efficiency dynamics, the supervisory authorities can react proactively to
prevent bank failures or collusive behavior. This prudent activity is of utmost import-
ance, bearing in mind that a significant efficiency drop of a systemic important bank
could trigger extremely disruptive market trends and induced failures across the mar-
ket. Also, increasing competition goes vis-a-vis with excessive risk-taking practices,
which could result in liquidity crises, an undercapitalised banking industry, and sys-
temic financial instability.
The paper aims to contribute to the existing literature that tackles efficiency
dynamics in different banking structures, especially the literature that deals with post-
transition banking markets (the young banking markets). More importantly, the main
intention is to provide some empirical insight into the efficiency dynamics of the
Croatian banking industry both at the sectoral and bank-group level. Accordingly, it
is important to emphasise the several research questions this paper aims to tackle.
First, it examines the crisis-driven impact on the efficiency trends of Croatian banks,
together with the impact of EU membership. More importantly, we have challenged
the scale efficiency and agency theory hypotheses, as well as the home-field advantage
and efficiency structure hypotheses. It is worth noting that we will use the terms
economies of scale and scale efficiency interchangeably, although some authors make a
distinction between them.
Numerous country-based and region-based empirical studies have been published
recently, and all of them rely on either the production or intermediation approach,
using various parametric and non-parametric approaches (mainly SFA and DEA). We
have chosen the intermediation approach, together with the variable return to scale
(BCC) output-oriented DEA. The paper is structured as follows: the introductory sec-
tion is followed by a literature outline focused on the methods, findings and possible
methodological drawbacks; in the second part we have described our dataset and
methodological framework (the DEA efficiency and super-efficiency models); the
third part highlights the results and discussion, while the last section summarises the
concluding remarks and policy implications.
2. Literature survey
There is a significant body of literature devoted to measuring the efficiency of banks,
and the studies differ greatly regarding methodology, input and output variables, and
34 M. DAVIDOVIC ET AL.
country/regional dispersion. To make the survey is more relevant from the perspec-
tive of the Croatian banks, we will focus on the empirical studies of the developing
counties in Europe and Asia. For example, Nenovsky, Chobanov, Mihaylova, and
Koleva (2008) have exploited DEA methodology (the operational and intermediation
DEA approaches) to estimate the efficiency of Bulgarian banks, covering the period
1999–2006. Their results contrast the home-field advantage hypothesis as the foreign
banks are more efficient than domestic banks, both the private and state-owned ones.
Obviously, the privatisation of the state-owned banks has had beneficial effects in
terms of operational efficiency. Also, there is the effect of scale economy, and large
banks are more efficient than medium and small banks. (Nenovsky et al., 2008). The
results generated from this approach are especially problematic, bearing in mind that
some input variables (for example, fixed assets and the number of employees) are not
always related to the output variables (loans and securities) in an operational sense.
In addition, Staub, Souza, and Tabak (2009) have used both the stochastic frontier
approach (panel data analysis) and deterministic approach (DEA), aiming at measur-
ing the technical and allocative efficiency of Brazilian banks in the period 2000–2007.
The findings suggest that non-performing loans and market share are important effi-
ciency determinants. The results also support the home field advantage hypothesis,
since domestic banks are more cost-effective than foreign ones. Also, private banks
are less efficient in comparison with state-owned banks, thus failing to uphold the
agency theory hypothesis. By using both the stochastic and deterministic approaches,
the analysis seems to be more reliable but the results are biased due to the nature of
the NPL and equity (they are not fully controlled by banks).
Metthews, Xiao, and Xu (2009) have investigated the efficiency of the Chinese
banks by using the DEA approach. Precisely, they measured cost-inefficiency and
used a non-parametric bootstrapping method to decompose it into X-inefficiency and
allocative inefficiency. Overall, the Chinese banks have upgraded their efficiency by
reducing both X-inefficiency and allocative inefficiency, although state-owned banks
were less successful in this process in comparison with joint-stock commercial banks.
The results generated from the study are quite specific, but understanding could be
deepened if they had challenged the scale efficiency hypothesis. In addition, it would
be quite instructive to follow the efficiency trends of the Chinese banks during the
pre-crisis and crisis years.
In addition, Andries and Cocris (2010) have compared the efficiency scores of the
largest banks in Romania, the Czech Republic and Hungary in the period 2000–2006
by using the stochastic frontier approach and data envelopment analysis. The
Romanian banks are the least efficient, although overall cost efficiency has increased
dramatically over the years. This has been caused by the reduction of non-performing
loans and administrative expenses (Andries & Cocris, 2010, A comparative analysis of
the efficiency of Romanian Banks). The two-method approach minimises the poten-
tial error caused by the dataset distribution hypothesis sample used in the study.
However, the sample is quite problematic because only the largest banks from differ-
ent countries were selected, and they did not face the same market conditions.
In an extended research study, Castellanos and Garza-Garcia (2013) have examined
the cost efficiency of banks in Mexico, covering the period 2002–2012. They found
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evidence that crisis-driven factors have reduced the efficiency of Mexican banks, espe-
cially during the initial crisis years. Although their findings support the home-field
advantage hypothesis in a sense (the local banks are more efficient), the results
emphasise a kind of systematic efficiency of both the domestic and foreign banks.
Finally, the Spanish banks are the efficiency leaders among the foreign banks, which
also supports the home-field advantage hypothesis to an extent (Castellanos & Garza-
Garcia, 2013). One critical point of this study is related to the scale efficiency hypoth-
esis. Namely, the results do not shed light on scale economies, and it is also impos-
sible to draw any conclusion regarding the market structure and efficiency
structure hypotheses.
Another interesting study that tackles the Macedonian banking sector (Micajkova
& Popovska, 2013) was aimed at measuring the technical, pure technical and scale
efficiency of 15 Macedonian banks, covering the period 2008–2011. They used both
the CCR and BCC models, with total deposits received and labor costs as the input
variables, and loans to banks and customers and investments, as the output variables.
The difference in scores suggests that scale efficiency is the main source of ineffi-
ciency. However, the study did not reveal other efficiency sources, such as ownership
structure, economies of scale, or market dominance. Finally, this study does not
address the impact of the global crisis.
In a comparative study, Jayaraman, Srinivasan, and Jeremic (2013) have employed
the DBA and profit DEA to evaluate the efficiency of Indian banks, covering the
period 2005–2012. They used deployed funds (performing loans and investments) as
the output variables, and equity, borrowed funds (deposits and borrowings), work
force (number of employees) and the number of branches as the input variables.
Their findings are quite specific: out of 34 banks, seven banks are DBA efficient, 10
banks are DEA efficient and five are both DBA and DEA efficient. The results also
revealed two important points: (a) there is no significant discrepancy in the rankings
based upon the two approaches; (b) the results support scale efficiency. However, the
results cannot be related to either the agency theory or home-field advantage hypoth-
eses, and the input side of the model is over-specified. Furthermore, the global crisis
is not considered an important determinant of bank performances.
In addition, Murat Ar and Kurtaran, (2013) estimated the efficiency of 13 Turkish
banks in 2011, using an integrated AHP/DEA approach. They rejected the agency
theory hypothesis since the state-owned banks are efficiency leaders. In addition, the
foreign-owned banks are the least efficient, meaning that the results support the
home-field advantage hypothesis. The most obvious disadvantage of this study is the
static orientation, because the efficiency scores are only determined for one year,
which could be highly influenced by random factors. In addition, it lacks scale effi-
ciency analysis.
Another extensive study (Repkova & Paleckova, 2013) uses the Window DEA to
determine the efficiency dynamics of the Czech banking sector. The study contrasts
the CCR and BCC scores to reveal the scale efficiency, covering the period
2003–2012. The results have detected the return to scale as the main driving factor of
inefficiency, since the CCR scores reached 70–78% and the BCC scores reached
84–89%. The study addresses neither crisis-driven effects nor the efficiency
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differential between the group-level scores. Furthermore, the Window DEA is struc-
turally built to measure the efficiency of internal DMUs that are productionally inter-
dependent but controlled by the same higher-order managerial body.
In a more recent study, Fan (2016) investigated the efficiency trends of selected
Chinese banks in the post-crisis years (2008–2014) by implementing the integrated
DEA and super DEA models. Among the various detailed results, it is worth noting
that the Chinese banks increased their efficiency after the crisis. Technical efficiency
is mainly fueled by scale efficiency, while the latter is the main driving factor of the
efficiency convergence among the banks. The agency theory hypothesis has been
upheld, but state-owned banks have improved their efficiency dramatically since
2012. However, the comparison between the major bank groups sorted by size or ori-
gin of capital is missing, meaning that the main market hypotheses have not been
addressed. Also, we do not know the market share of the banks that comprise the
sample (60 banks sorted into three groups).
Finally, Andries and Ursu (2016) have implemented the multi-product translog
specification to assess the EU banks’ profit and cost efficiency in the period
2004–2010. Their findings argue in favor a positive impact of the crisis, especially for
the Eurozone banks. Specifically, the overall average efficiency score has increased by
about 0.9% (cost efficiency) and 3.6% (profit efficiency). The most significant increase
is recorded for the large banks (cost efficiency) and small banks (profit efficiency),
while only the non-euro area banks slightly reduced their efficiency in the crisis years.
As an extension of this research it would be quite interesting to see the efficiency
trends for different banking groups in both the Eurozone and Non-Eurozone coun-
tries, and challenge the market structure hypotheses for the single EU bank-
ing market.
A closer look at the literature in the field did not reveal any comparable study that
employs the data envelopment analysis to measure the efficiency of Croatian Banks,
meaning that this study can be considered an important contribution to the existing
literature. In addition, by varying samples/subsamples, this study provides a closer
look at the efficiency trends of different banking groups, aimed at challenging several
banking and market structure hypotheses. Furthermore, the results of the study can
be used as a benchmark to compare efficiency trends of the EU banking structures.
Finally, we have implemented both the DEA and super-efficiency DEA models, allow-
ing the ranking of the relatively efficient banks.
3. Data and methodology
The aim of the study is to measure the efficiency of the DMUs using the intermedi-
ation approach, widely accepted in banking theory. As for the inputs and outputs
structure, we have used interest and non-interest expenses as the input variables, and
interest and non-interest revenues as the output variables. So, the multi-product
approach has been implemented here, aimed at determining the relative efficiency
scores of the decision-making units, as well as the super-efficiency of previously
determined relative efficient ones.
ECONOMIC RESEARCH-EKONOMSKA ISTRAZIVANJA 37
The study deals with the DEA group of models used to determine the relative effi-
ciency of many DMUs that use multiple inputs to produce multiple outputs. Many
DEA models have been developed over time, starting from the constant return to
scale (CCR) model, which has been further extended to the variable return to scale
(BCC) model, then the additive and super-efficiency DEA models. DEA methodology
is based on the Pareto optimality which states that a DMU is more efficient than the
remaining ones if it is not possible to increase an output without decreasing another
output or increasing inputs. More formally, an efficient DMU is located on the pro-
duction possibility frontier, and the input and output slacks are zero. To determine
the efficiency frontier, DEA uses available data for each DMU instead of using a pre-
determined efficiency function. This is an obvious advantage of the DEA as a non-
parametric methodology. For more analysis of the DEA models see Charnes, Cooper,
and Rhodes (1978), Cooper, Seiford, and Tone (2007), and Wen (2015).
The paper employs both the BCC output-oriented and A-P super-efficiency mod-
els, using two inputs (interest and non-interest expenses) and two outputs (interest
and non-interest revenues). According to Banker, Charnes, and Cooper (1984),
Cooper et al. (2007), and Wen (2015), the models are presented in Table 1.
In these specifications, zi and zb are the input vectors, while yi and yb are output
vectors of the selected and benchmark DMUs. Also, x and c are vectors of the input
and output weights, respectively. By implementing the BCC, we have assumed the
variable return to scale. It implies that the efficiency of a DMU is determined by the
possibility of increasing output whilst keeping the amount of inputs fixed. So, the
greater the output increase, the less efficient the DMU, i.e. a DMU is considered effi-
cient if the relative efficiency score is 1 (100%). In addition, if the score is greater
than 1 (100%), a DMU is considered inefficient, and this upward-sloping deviation
from the cut-off point is a measure of inefficiency.
In comparison with the BCC model, the A-P super-efficiency model (Andersen &
Petersen, 1993) can rank the relatively efficient DMUs. Namely, to compare a DMU
with the remaining ones, the super-efficiency model does not use its own data as a
reference point. Precisely, the super-efficiency score measures the distance of the eval-
uated DMU (that is relatively efficient) from the new efficient frontier (Jablonsky,
2016). So, it measures the input slack to keep the DMU within the reconstructed effi-
ciency frontier. The model we have implemented is input-oriented, meaning that it
determines the efficiency of a DMU by the possibility of decreasing inputs, keeping
the outputs fixed. Any super-efficient DMU also has a score equal to 1 (100%), but
the inefficient DMUs have a score below 1. Accordingly, there are downward sloping
Table 1. BCC and A-P models.
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Source: Derived according to Banker et al. (1984), Cooper et al. (2007), and Wen (2015).
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efficiency deviations so that the farther the score from the efficiency frontier toward
zero, the more inefficient the DMU.
The dataset consists of the bank-level data extracted from the official CNB reports,
covering the period 2006–2015. To assess the crisis-driven efficiency trends, we have
further divided the sample into two subsequent periods: (1) the pre-crisis
(2006–2009); (2) the post-crisis (2010–2015). Furthermore, we have estimated the
impact of the EU association on the efficiency trends. The overall efficiency score has
been determined by using the full sample (all banks). To calculate the bank-group
scores, we had extracted the individual scores from the full sample scores, grouped
the banks with respect to different criteria, and then calculated the average scores for
all the groups.
As for the group-level efficiency scores, we have additionally selected the banks
according to their size/relative market power, ownership structure, and origin of
capital. Specifically, to classify banks according to their size, we have used the cri-
terion established by the Croatian National Bank (Croatian National Bank, 2006):
the relative market share (%) calculated as a ratio of the bank asset to the total
market asset. According to the CNB, the small banks have a relative market share
below 1%, the medium banks within 1–5%, and the large banks above 5%. Also,
both the ownership structure selection (state-owned and private banks), and the
origin of capital classification (domestic and foreign banks) are based on the offi-
cial data reported by the Croatian National Bank (CNB). By comparing different
group-level scores, we have basically challenged the following postulates: (1) the
scale efficiency and agency theory hypotheses; (2) the home-field advantage effi-
ciency structure hypotheses.
4. Results and discussion
In this section we have presented the main efficiency trends both at the industry level
and different group levels. To begin with, we will first consider the average efficiency
scores calculated for the pre-crisis (2006–2009) and crisis periods (2010–2015) pre-
sented in the Appendix (see Table A1). Accordingly, the most efficient banks before
the crisis were HVB Splitska Bank, Pozeska Bank, and Zagrebacka Bank. By compar-
ing the two periods, it is noticeable that the global crisis has reduced the efficiency of
the Croatian banks by about 3%. This evidence mainly coincides with the results of
the comparable studies, but it opposes the results for the EU banks (Andries & Ursu,
2016). The relatively efficient banks have a score equal to 100%, and they are consid-
ered the most efficient. This ranking should be treated cautiously, bearing in mind
that some relatively efficient banks operated only for a couple of years during the
observed periods. However, it is worth noting that some banks have kept their super-
ior efficiency positions over the years (Zagrebacka Bank, Business Bank Zagreb).
As for the super-efficiency scores at the end of the periods, the efficiency winners
have been presented in Table 2.
The super-efficiency banks are randomly distributed across different banking
groups (see RS column), so that we have a small, private and domestic bank as an
efficiency winner in the pre-crisis period. On the other hand, a large, private and
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foreign bank takes the leading position during the crisis years. However, we have a
reverse positioning at the bottom of this ranking: a large, private and foreign bank is
at the bottom of the scale for the pre-crisis period. On the contrary, a small, state-
owned and foreign bank, previously ranked as the most efficient, is the least super-
efficient bank for the crisis period. If we consider the intra-period changes, Erste
Bank and OTP Bank Croatia have improved their positions dramatically, while
Stedbank and Karlovacka Bank have experienced an opposite trend.
To challenge the abovementioned banking and efficiency structure hypotheses, we
further sorted the banks into different groups and calculated the average scores
respectively. The results have been provided in the following figures.
Figure 1 shows the average efficiency scores for the market leaders and competitive
fringe, as well as for all the market players (the year-by-year efficiency trends have
been presented in Table A2, see Appendix). It is worth nothing that the results are
related to the output-oriented model: an increased score implies a decrease in effi-
ciency. Overall, the results are quite instructive for several reasons. Namely, the global
crisis has diminished the efficiency of the Croatian banks, which is in line with the
results of Castellanos and Garza-Garcia (2013), but in sharp contrast with the find-

















All banks Top 5 Last 5 Top 10 Last 10
2006-2009 2010-2015
Figure 1. The relatively-efficient scores for the market leaders and competitive fringe (%).
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the CNB official data.





RES (%) SES (%) RS RES (%) SES (%) RS
Sav. B. of Sm. Ent. 100.00 100.00 1 Erste&Steierm. Bank 100.00 96.35 1
Stedbank 100.00 85.38 2 OTP Bank Croatia 100.00 95.54 2
Karlovacka Bank 100.00 84.03 3 Primorska Bank 100.00 94.83 3
Erste&Steierm. Bank 100.00 83.98 4 Imex Bank 100.00 92.33 4
Soc-Gen-Splitska Bank 100.00 83.96 5 Croatian Post Bank 100.00 91.12 5
Obrtnicka Saving Bank 100.00 81.52 6 Veneto Bank 100.00 90.68 6
Med-umurska Bank 100.00 76.99 7 Bank Kovanica 100.00 88.14 7
BKS Bank 100.00 73.12 8 Cred. Bank Umag 100.00 86.23 8
Bank Kovanica 100.00 61.87 9 Soc-Gen. Spl. Bank 100.00 82.84 9
Zagrebacka Bank 100.00 51.58 10 Tesla Saving Bank 100.00 79.89 10
Average 100.00 78.24 - Average 100.00 89.79 -
Note: RES – Relative Efficiency Score; SES – Super Efficiency Score; RS – Rank of a super-efficient bank.
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the CNB official data.
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it has to do with the nature of the input-output model. Correspondingly, as the result
of an external shock the Croatian banks have collected proportionally less revenue
(the NPL has exploded during the crisis period), in comparison with slightly decreas-
ing expenses. Consequently, the industry-level efficiency scores have dropped by
about 3%. It is also assumed that banks had an asset/liability maturity gap prior to
the crisis years, and the interest and non-interest revenues could not have been
adjusted quickly without substantial costs. Thus, these dynamic reshufflings have
resulted in increased inefficiency over the crisis years.
The results also showed a huge efficiency differential between the market leaders
and competitive fringe. Namely, the market leaders exploit the scale economies effect
and thereby the scale efficiency and efficiency structure hypotheses have been proved.
Regarding scale efficiency, we can find the same results in Nenovsky et al. (2008).
Specifically, the top ten, top five and bottom five banks improved their efficiency dur-
ing the crisis, possibly as a result of necessary rationalisation on both the borrowing
and lending sides. On the other hand, the last 10 banks recorded a decreasing effi-
ciency trend (about 7.5%). It seems that the smallest banks have had a pronounced
maturity gap, and the worst loan and investment portfolios, so that they ended up at
the bottom of the efficiency ranking.
To make an additional challenge to the scale efficiency hypothesis, we have
grouped the banks according to their size (their market share has been used as a cri-
terion, which is in line with CNB standards). The results are presented in Figure 2,
and it presents the size-specific average efficiency scores for Croatian banks for both
periods (for annual efficiency trends see Appendix, Table A3). Medium and large
banks have increased their efficiency dramatically, while small banks became even
more inefficient during the crisis.
Apart from the maturity gap, an additional explanation could be that small banks
had comparatively fewer options to reshuffle their balance sheets, and some ineffi-
ciency sufficed as the consequence of a weak market position. The downward effi-
ciency trends can also be caused by less efficient risk management know-how, lack of
cross-border support, or late/suboptimal countercyclical measures. Obviously, the big-
gest market players are the most efficient in both periods, and the results again sup-











Small banks Medium banks Large banks
2006-2009 2010-2015
Figure 2. The average efficiency score of the small, medium, and large banks (%).
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the CNB official data.
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hypotheses. Consequently, the biggest banks acquire greater market share, shaping
the market structure of the Croatian banking industry. The later results are very
important, bearing in mind that the CNB acts in a supervisory authority, with one of
its responsibilities to establish and maintain reasonable competition, as well as to pro-
tect customers in the banking market.
Figure 3 shows the ownership-specific efficiency scores in both periods (the annual
efficiency changes have been presented in the Appendix, Table A4). These results are
even more interesting, bearing in mind the common beliefs associated with the ineffi-
ciency of state ownership.
State-owned banks were more efficient than private ones in both periods. Thus,
the agency theory hypothesis is strongly rejected, which coincides with the results of
Staub et al. (2009) but opposes the findings of Fan (2016). Moreover, the state banks
also improved their efficiency during the crisis years by 13%. Size-wise, the state
banks are mainly medium and small, so that their efficiency improvements have not
resulted from a dominant market position. Also, state-owned banks have been forced
to improve their efficiency during the transition phase, and most of them were taken
over by international strategic investors. Under increasingly competitive pressure, the
remaining state banks have focused on operational efficiency to defend their market










State-owned banks Private banks
Figure 3. The average efficiency score of the state-owned and private banks (%).











Domestic banks Foreign banks
Figure 4. The average efficiency score of the domestic and foreign banks (%).
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the CNB official data.
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banks, and that variations in the average scores could be caused by the sam-
ple structure.
On the other hand, private banks, although some of them are market leaders, are
moderately efficient, and the global crisis even lowered their average efficiency score.
Accordingly, the cross-border business relations (the international exposure) of the
Croatian banks, which are in fact branches of the foreign banking groups, are indis-
putably the main cause of these adverse efficiency trends.
Figure 4 shows the average efficiency scores for the banks grouped according to
capital origin (the annual efficiency movements are presented in the Appendix, Table
A5). Here we have the most obvious irreversible efficiency movements: (a) the rela-
tively inefficient domestic banks in the first period improved their efficiency score
remarkably during the crisis time (by about 52%); (b) initially far more efficient for-
eign banks lowered their efficiency score during the crisis. Consequently, we can
reject the home-field advantage hypothesis for the first period, which coincides with
the results of Nenovsky et al. (2008). On the contrary, we fail to reject the hypothesis
for the crisis period and we can find the same evidence in some recent studies (Staub
et al., 2009; Castellanos & Garza-Garcia, 2013; Murat Ar & Kurtaran, 2013).
Obviously, the foreign banks are far more vulnerable to the adverse shocks due to
maturity mismatch, international exposure, poor risk management in the pre-crisis
period, and ineffective/inappropriate business model reconfiguration. Specifically, a
sharp decline in efficiency in 2010 was initiated by the inappropriately rebalanced
liabilities and sharply decreasing/worsening productive asset so that the income fall
was not fully offset by the expenses cut.
It is also important to analyse the efficiency dynamics of the Croatian banking
industry relative to the EU association (July 2013). To recognise the main trends, we
have used the annual efficiency changes (see Appendix, Table A1 through Table A5).
Bearing in mind that the output-oriented model has been implemented here, the
lower the score the more efficient the bank (bank group). Accordingly, the Croatian
banking industry has increased its efficiency since EU association. Specifically, the
average overall score before the EU membership was 176.98%, while the score after
EU association was 131.76%.
The beneficial effects of EU membership can be explained by the risk premium
before and after EU association. Namely, the Croatian economy (and its banking sec-
tor) is considered less risky after the association, meaning that cross-border borrow-
ings became less expensive. Namely, the risk decline is now reflected through lower
interest rates for the intra-bank borrowings (the transactions between the bank hold-
ings abroad and their representatives in Croatia), and the Croatian banks have
become more efficient. In addition, the non-interest expenses for the international
transactions with EU counties have been adjusted as Croatia became an EU member.
On the other hand, the real sector expectations are positively impacted by this move
and the Croatian companies have become more risk-loving. Consequently, the real
sector was more willing to invest and take additional banking loans. This asymmetric
risk perception has led to greater interest and non-interest revenues and smaller
interest and non-interest expenses, causing an upward sloping efficiency trend follow-
ing EU membership.
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Although the banking industry has improved its efficiency, these benefits are not
equally shared across the bank groups. For example, small and large banks improved
their efficiency after EU membership, in comparison with the medium banks whose
efficiency scores deteriorated slightly. The key market players were able to manage
the increasing pressure from the single EU market successfully, which is predomin-
antly reflected in increased revenues. In addition, the small banks serving particularly
closed market niches were not exposed to such a sharp competitive pressure.
Consequently, their revenues remained stable, and the cost cutting resulted in
increased operative efficiency. All other bank groups (see Appendix, Table A2
through A5) also increased their efficiency dramatically after 2013 (for example, the
private banks for 58%, state-owned banks for 44.8%). Finally, the medium banks
recorded a minor efficiency decline in 2015 (about 1.8%), which was caused by a sig-
nificant efficiency drop of the SBER Bank (by about 33%).
5. Concluding remarks
The paper aims to estimate the efficiency trends of the Croatian banking industry,
covering the period 2006–2015. We have implemented the variable return to scale
(BCC) output-oriented DEA model to determine the relative efficient scores, together
with the super-efficiency DEA model to rank the relatively efficient banks. Within the
intermediation approach we have selected the interest and non-interest expenses on
one hand, and interest and non-interest revenues on the other hand, as the input and
output variables, respectively. The initial sample is further collapsed into the pre-crisis
(2006–2009) and post-crisis (2010–2015) periods to address the crisis-driven effi-
ciency movements. The impact of the EU membership is also assessed by comparing
the scores before and after EU association. It is worth of noting that these results
should be treated cautiously because the period before the EU association overlaps
the period of adverse crisis effects, so that it is impossible to isolate the pure effects.
To challenge the banking and market hypotheses, the Croatian banks have addition-
ally been grouped according to the relative market power (small, medium, large, mar-
ket leaders, and competitive fringe), ownership structure (state-owned and private
banks), and origin of capital (domestic and foreign banks).
Overall, the results are quite instructive, so that at least two important conclusions
can be drawn: (1) the crisis has had detrimental effects on the Croatian banking
industry, and the overall efficiency score has declined by about 3%; (2) the banking
industry has largely benefited from EU membership, bearing in mind that the overall
efficiency score has increased by about 45%. The first statement regarding the crisis
effects is to some extent in line with other empirical findings (for example,
Castellanos & Garza-Garcia, 2013) but is also in sharp contrast with some recent
studies (Fan, 2016; Andries & Ursu, 2016). It seems that the Croatian banks could
not optimise their operational efficiency and mitigate the adverse effects of the crisis,
due to such a hostile business environment and balance sheet maturity gaps.
The group-specific results are particularly interesting. Namely, the market leaders
are far more efficient than competitive fringe, and there is a significant positive effi-
ciency differential between the large, medium and small banks. Correspondingly, we
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can draw at least two important conclusions: (1) the Croatian banks exploit econo-
mies of scale, implying that the scale efficiency hypothesis has been proved; (2) the
banking market is predominantly shaped by the leading banks, meaning that we have
also proved the efficiency structure hypothesis. The scale efficiency effect is an
expected result due to similar findings of others (for example, Nenovsky et al., 2008),
while the results regarding the efficiency structure hypothesis have not been identified
by any previous research. Moreover, medium and large banks have increased their
efficiency in the post-crisis years, implying that they are more flexible to rapid market
changes caused by adverse external shocks. The efficiency differentials between differ-
ent banking groups are mainly caused by a balance sheet maturity mismatch, coupled
with a dominant market position, and financial and operational advantages that are
largely exploited by the market leaders. Finally, both small and large banks benefited
from EU association, while medium banks have recorded more or less the same aver-
age efficiency score as before the EU membership. Specifically, large banks have
improved their efficiency score by about 8%. However, small banks have benefited
the most (they improved their average efficiency score by about 45%), probably due
to isolated market niches (not significantly affected by the increased competition)
coupled with increased operative efficiency.
The results regarding the ownership-specific efficiency trends are quite counterin-
tuitive. Namely, state-owned banks were more efficient than the private ones in both
periods. Furthermore, the crisis-driven factors have influenced only private banks
adversely, while state banks additionally improved their efficiency performances over
the crisis years. Consequently, the agency theory hypothesis is strongly rejected, and
these results coincide with the results of Staub et al. (2009), while opposing the find-
ings of Fan (2016). The main reasons for these reverse movements are related not
only to the extensive international exposure of the private banks, but also to the
appropriate maturity setting and operational flexibility of the state banks inherited
from the transitional phase. In addition, the state banks are not the market leaders,
and efficiency trends are not guided by relative market dominance. On the other
hand, a vast minority of the Croatian banks are state-owned (for example, two out of
25 banks in 2015), meaning that efficiency movements are also largely affected by the
sample structure. As for EU membership effects, both bank groups largely benefited,
but the private ones have obtained significantly larger efficiency gains (58% compared
to 44.8%).
Our findings regarding the home-field advantage hypothesis are mixed, dependent
upon the observed timeframe: (1) initially more efficient foreign banks have experi-
enced a significant efficiency drop over the crisis years; (2) initially inferior domestic
banks have increased their efficiency during the crisis. Accordingly, the home-field
advantage hypothesis has been rejected for the pre-crisis period (similar to Nenovsky
et al., 2008), and accepted for the latter period. The later result matches Staub et al.
(2009), and Castellanos and Garza-Garcia (2013). These reversible movements are
mainly caused by the proportionally larger international exposure, together with
inappropriate risk management of the foreign banks prior to the global crisis. In add-
ition, the balance sheet structure of the domestic banks proved to be more resilient to
adverse external shocks. Finally, the foreign banks benefited more from the EU
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membership than the domestic ones (58% compared to 48%), but both bank groups
have rapidly increased their efficiency. This result is expected because the Croatian
banking industry was strongly internationalised before EU association, so that the for-
eign banks have experienced a kind of competitive advantage when entered the single
EU market.
The main implications of the findings are at least twofold, both at the bank level
and industry level. Namely, private ownership is not a decisive efficiency determinant,
and economies of scale are largely exploited by the most efficient banks.
Consequently, Croatian banks should implement the scale efficiency approach and
improve their overall efficiency through mergers and acquisitions. At the industry
level, the results are quite intuitive for the regulatory bodies in Croatia. Namely, to
prevent possible bank failures and internally generated financial crises, the regulatory
authorities could monitor efficiency trends as a part of the prudent supervisory meas-
ures against the most inefficient banks. To prevent the banking market from becom-
ing over-competitive, regulatory agencies should closely monitor the efficiency
movements of the market leaders. It is a critical point, keeping in mind that the
over-competitive environment forces market players to implement an excessive risk-
taking practice, making banks prone to liquidity crises and failures.
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APPENDIX
Table A1. Efficiency scores and corresponding ranks of banks in Croatia.
Bank name/Average
score/Rank
Average Rank Bank name/Average
score/Rank
Average Rank
2006–2009 2006–2009 2010–2015 2010–2015
A Saving Bank of Small Enterp. 100.00% 1 A Saving Bank of Small Enterp. 100.00% 1
Gospodarsko-Kreditna Bank 100.00% 1 Credo Bank 100.00% 1
HVB Splitska Bank 100.00% 1 Privredna Bank Zagreb 100.00% 1
Pozeska Bank 100.00% 1 Zagrebacka Bank 100.00% 1
Zagrebacka Bank 100.00% 1 Erste&Steiermarkishe Bank 105.00% 2
Banca Sonic  100.29% 2 Voklsbank 105.77% 3
Hypo-Aple-Adria-Bank 106.01% 3 Tesla Saving Bank 106.12% 4
Podravska Bank 108.12% 4 Stedbank 113.20% 5
Med-umurska Bank 110.78% 5 Med-umurska Bank 113.62% 6
Kvarner Bank 111.12% 6 Istarska Crediit Bank Umag 114.77% 7
Stedbank 114.36% 7 Societe-Generale-Splitska Bank 114.81% 8
Slavonska Bank 118.89% 8 OTP Bank Croatia 114.96% 9
Societe-Generale-Splitska Bank 119.83% 9 Croatian Post Bank 114.98% 10
Privredna Bank Zagreb 120.58% 10 Raiffeisenbank Austria 117.37% 11
Croatian Post Bank 121.67% 11 Hypo-Aple-Adria-Bank 120.45% 12
Voklsbank 123.56% 12 Imex Bank 127.99% 13
Raiffeisenbank Austria 126.26% 13 Bank Brod 128.42% 14
Erste&Steiermarkishe Bank 135.09% 14 Veneto Bank 136.58% 15
Banco Popolare Croatia 136.09% 15 Partner bank 136.69% 16
Istarska Credit Bank Umag 136.62% 16 Sberbank 137.86% 17
OTP Bank Croatia 140.21% 17 Banco Popolare Croatia 142.29% 18
Veneto Bank 145.86% 18 Vaba Bank Varazdin 143.83% 19
Centar Bank 158.94% 19 Bank Splitsko-Dalmatinska 147.51% 20
Bank Splitsko-Dalmatinska 161.70% 20 Jadranska Bank 153.26% 21
Slatinska Bank 169.73% 21 Slatinska Bank 156.04% 22
Obrtnicka Saving Bank 180.06% 22 Centar Bank 160.42% 23
Vaba Bank Varazdin 180.95% 23 BKS Bank 163.75% 24
Jadranska Bank 183.33% 24 Croatia Bank 167.18% 25
Imex Bank 192.87% 25 Karlovacka Bank 173.87% 26
Karlovacka Bank 196.95% 26 Credit Bank Zagreb 176.80% 27
Croatia Bank 200.78% 27 Bank Kovanica 177.51% 28
BKS Bank 209.43% 28 Samoborska Bank 181.26% 29
Partner Bank 216.36% 29 Nava Bank 216.59% 30
Bank Brod 221.56% 30 Primorska Bank 303.68% 31
Nava Bank 225.95% 31 Podravska Bank 501.52% 32
Credo Bank 241.74% 32 Kentbank 648.21% 33
Credit Bank Zagreb 269.91% 33 Banca Sonic BNO BNO
Samoborska Bank 271.97% 34 Gospodarsko-Kreditna Bank BNO BNO
Bank Kovanica 298.41% 35 Kvarner Bank BNO BNO
Primorska Bank 301.10% 36 Obrtnicka Stedna Bank BNO BNO
Kentbank BNO BNO Pozeska Bank BNO BNO
Sberbank BNO BNO Slavonska Bank BNO BNO
Tesla Saving Bank BNO BNO HVB Splitska Bank BNO BNO
Average score 161.43% ——————Average score 164.51% ——————
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the CNB official reports.Banks which operated for a single year during the analysed period; Banks which operated for just two years dur-
ing the analysed period.
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Table A3. Efficiency scores: small vs medium vs large banks (%).
Pre-crisis period
Bank group/Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 Average
Small 202.77 146.13 221.7 160.29 182.72
Medium 111.96 122.84 144.95 119.86 124.9
Large 108.64 128.31 129.3 103.43 117.42
Post-crisis period
Bank group/Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Average
Small 326.85 125.77 245.72 149.67 139.3 114.76 183.68
Medium 124.29 104.52 108.13 124.03 113.42 126.71 116.85
Large 114.77 106.19 108.24 101.25 102.05 115.07 105.31
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the CNB official data.
Table A4. Efficiency scores: state-owned vs private banks (%).
Pre-crisis period
Bank group/Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 Average
State-owned banks 198.89 140.97 143.33 148.04 157.81
Private banks 174.01 140.01 214.68 161.71 172.6
Post-crisis period
Bank group/Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Average
State-owned banks 234.7 111.39 100.00 104.86 116.43 106.00 127.23
Private banks 272.15 121.01 217.13 137.71 128.51 117.33 165.64
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the CNB official data.
Table A5. Domestic vs foreign banks (%).
Pre-crisis period
Bank group/Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 Average
Domestic banks 220.23 153.46 256.61 154.14 196.11
Foreign banks 130.72 130.19 169.47 144.66 143.76
Post-crisis period
Bank group/Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Average
Domestic banks 200.93 128.91 144.78 148.2 126.71 119.25 144.8
Foreign banks 320.68 114.08 249.87 123.58 127.54 114.09 174.97
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the CNB official data.
Table A2. Efficiency scores for the market leaders and competitive fringe (%).
Pre-crisis period
Bank group/Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 Average
All banks 175.48 140.06 181.35 148.84 161.43
Top 5 110.36 128.32 135.15 102.75 119.15
Bottom 5 189.82 134.33 272.8 222.87 204.96
Top 10 109.96 126.12 135.56 109.32 120.24
Bottom 10 170.65 169.72 261.03 194.04 198.86
Post-crisis period
Bank group/Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Average
All banks 269.88 120.15 201.6 142.07 137.1 116.11 164.48
Top 5 100.00 107.42 109.89 108.24 100.00 116.60 107.03
Bottom 5 387.23 140.95 184.39 178.06 127.06 118.98 189.45
Top 10 119.11 105.73 113.2 118.07 105.46 120.26 113.64
Bottom 10 291.09 130.63 370.17 169.74 150.55 126.64 206.47
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the CNB official data.
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